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COURT OF APPEALS, 1957 TERM
PROPERTY
Liability of Tenant for Damages for Period of Appeal from Dispossess Order-
Emergency Rent Law
The Legislature enacted the Emergency Rent Law' to remedy the unequal
bargaining position between landlord and tenant existing because of the chronic
shortage of business and commercial rental space. The law compels the landlord to
continue the tenant in possession after the expiration of the lease2 so long as the
tenant actually occupies3 the premises, in exchange for which the landlord receives
an artificially imposed statutory rental 4
A statutory tenantO may be removed only as provided for by stature.6 One
provision for eviction, known as the "match-lease" clause, provides that under
defined circumstances the landlord may enter into a lease with a third party, and
if the tenant refuses to enter into a lease substantially the same7 as that offered
to the third party, the tenant may be dispossessed."
In Self Service Super Market v. Harris,9 a previous disposition was had
between the same parties, and a final dispossess order pursuant to summary
dispossess proceedings'0 was entered against the tenant on March 2, 1950. A stay
of issuance of the dispossess warrant was granted for a limited time" under the
Business Space Law' 2 until July 2, 1950, inasmuch as the tenant needed additional
time to vacate because of unusual circumstances or inconvenience.' 3 The tenant
obtained subsequent stays of the dispossess warrant pending appeal 14 until the
1. The Commercial Space Law and the Business Space Law, which are
similar in substance and purpose, comprise the Emergency Rent Law, and are
found in N. Y. Unconsol. Laws §§8521-8538, and §§8551-8567 respectively. Also see
Analysis of the New York State Emergency Rent Statutes by Frank A. Barrera
in N. Y. Unconsol. Laws, pp. 775-810 (McKinney 1953). Only the Business Space
Law is relevant in this note.
2. Stern v. Equitable Trust Co. of New York, 238 N.Y. 267, 144 N.E. 578
(1924).
3. 207-17 West 25th St. Co. v. Blu-Strike Safety Razor Blade Co., 277 App.
Div. 93, 98 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1st Dep't 1950), rev'd on other grounds, 302 N.Y. 624, 97
N.E.2d 356 (1951).
4. Supra note 2. Also see N. Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §8558 (1953).
5. A tenant in possession by virtue of the Emergency Rent Law is defined
as a statutory tenant.
6. N. Y. Unconsol. Laws §8558 (1953).
7. Self Service Super Market v. Harris, 303 N.Y. 868, 104 N.E.2d 921 (1952).
8. Supra note 6, §8558(k).
9. 3 N.Y.2d 615, 170 N.Y.S.2d 816 (1958).
10. N. Y. Civ. PmAc. ACr §§1410-1447.
11. Supra note 6, §8558(m).
12. Supra note 1.
13. Colonna & Co. v. Anthony M. Meyerstein, Inc, 198 Misc. 556, 96 N.Y.S.2d
316 (Sup.Ct. 1950), aff'd. 278 App. Div. 588, 102 N.Y.S.2d 920, appeal den. 278 App.
Div. 697, 103 N.Y.S.2d 655 (2d Dep't. 1950),
14. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §1443.
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dispossess order was finally affirmed, whereupon a warrant was issued on April 1,
1952. The tenant continued to pay only the statutory rental until eviction.
"Th2 landlord then brought this damage action 15 to recover the difference
between the statutory rental and the fair rental value of the premises, alleging
such damages accrued from the date of the entry of the final dispossess order on
March 2, 1950, until the tenant was evicted. The Court held (6-1), in an opinion
written by Judge Van Voorhis, that the tenant was liable for the difference
between the statutory rental and the fair rental value, not from the date of entry
of the final dispossess order on March 2, 1950, but from the expiration on July 2,
1950, of the stay obtained under the Business Space Law until the tenant was
evicted under the dispossess warrant.
Ordinarily the entry of the final dispossess order terminates the statutory
tenancy, though the tenant thereafter continues in possession.10 However, the
statutory tenancy is not terminated by the entry of the final order where the
warrant is subsequently stayed as provided for by the Business Space Law. 1"
In Smith v. Feigin,18 a statutory tenant continuing in possession after the
termination of the statutory tenancy was held to have the status of a trespasser,
and liable for storage charges which the landlord was required to pay to store
his equipment during the holding over period. Dicta in the Feigin case suggesting
that the statutory tenant wrongfully holding over is liable in damages to the
landlord for the difference between the statutory rental and the fair rental value
became law in 207-17 West 25th St. Co. v. Blu-Strike Safety Razor Blade Co.'0
The tenant's contention in the present case was that a stay granted by the
Court merely continued the tenant in possession against the will of the landlord
as was the case prior to the entry of the dispossess order, and if in possession by
permission of the Court, the tenant had a legal right to the premises, and could
not be held to have the status and liability of a trespasser.
The Court said that the stay taken pursuant to the Business Space Law by
reason of circumstances affecting the tenancy extended the statutory tenancy,
but held that the tenant obtained subsequent stays pending appeal at his peril.
The decision recognized the distinction in purpose between stays obtained under
the Business Space Law because of hardship or other inconvenience and
stays merely obtained under the Civil Practice Act pending appeal. The
15. Supra note 9.
16. Smith v. Feigin, 276 App. Div. 531, 96 N.Y.S.2d 123 (1st Dep't 1950).
17. Supra note 13.
18. Supra note 16.
19. Supra note 3. Cf. 105 Franklin Street Corp. v. Seratoff, 284 App, Dlv.
262, 131 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1st Dep't 1954).
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majority reasoned that if the tenant were not liable to the landlord for the land-
lord's losses caused by a stay pending appeal, then tlhe language of section 1443
of the Civil Practice Act, insofar as it requires the posting of a bond to cover
damages where such a stay is obtained, would be meaningless. The majority
pointed out that if the tenant were liable only for the statutory rental and not the
fair rental value during the period in which a stay was granted pending appeal,
a tenant, merely by appealing and obtaining such a stay of the warrant, would be
able to "elevate himself by lifting his own bootstraps."
Judge Burke, in a vigorous dissenting opinion, contended that the statutory
tenancy continues until the issuance of the dispossess warrant, and that in any
event, a tenant in possession by permission of the Court does not incur the
liability of a trespasser. He argued that the majority decision, in allowing this
cause of action, inhibits the process of appeal in these cases, and is therefore
against the spirit of the Legislature's intentions. He suggested that the landlord's
proper recourse was to have the statutory rental increased as prescribed by the
statute.
There are three possible alternative solutions to this situation. First, the
tenant could be evicted after the entry of the dispossess order though appeal is
pending, but this is so impractical that neither litigant would suggest it. Second,
the tenant could be allowed to stay in possession after the entry of the dispossess
order, being liable only for the artificially low .statutory rental. Third, the tenant
could be allowed to stay in possession, by permission of the Court, after entry of
the dispossess order pending appeal, but liable in damages as a trespasser should
he lose on appeal This third approach forces the tenant to appeal at his own
risk, and not at the risk of the landlord. Therefore it not only precludes a
disgruntled tenant from utilizing an appeal to perpetuate the statutory rental
after the trial court has held him liable for the higher fair rental value, but also,
by allowing the tenant to appeal only at his own risk, inhibits the encumbering of
the courts with bad-faith appeals.
Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment-Payment of Rent Condition Precedent
to Suit by Tenant
In Herstein Co. v. Columbia Pictures Corp.,20 the tenant brought an action
for damages against his landlord for breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment Under
the lease, the covenant of quiet enjoyment was predicated upon the payment of
rent. In November 1955, the tenant was in default in his rent; the landlord in
the same month began alterations which the tenant alleged constituted a partial
actual eviction. The Court held that the action could not be maintained.
20. 4 N.Y.2d 117, 17 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1958). "
